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Abstract 
 
The diversity and complexity of the arguments and criticisms among philosophers on the 
question of the actual existence of the self can be condensed into two contrasting issues: The 
self is an experienced phenomenon that is generalized into a concept to assign to the cognitive 
subject as a tool for identification, or the self has its own existence as a transcendental ent ity 
that is activated and developed through interactions between the cognitive sub ject  and the 
environment. Dan Zahavi summed up the endless controversy over the formation of the self in  
phenomenology, existentialism, and new insights in neuroscience to conclude that the exist -
ence of the self is only meaningful when it is "the experiential self." My article wi l l  focus on  
two issues: firstly, the self is formed by the interaction between the subject and the ob ject  in  
which the object is actively engaged in the control space of the subject; secondly, the under-
standing of the subject's self-perception process, through the perspective of neuroscience, i s 
triggered by the subject seeing itself in the other person. 
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Possession of things is the beginning of the process of the self's formation 
 
There is nothing else like "the self." If there is something similar, it is  just an "ontolog i-
cally independent entity." In his book Self & Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and 
Shame, Dan Zahavi started his argument on the real existence of the notion of the self by 
using the anti-realism ideals of Thomas Metzinger and Miri Albahari.  
Through use of neuroscience findings, Metzinger denies the existence of the self as "a 
really existing entity." He stresses that the notion and content of the self are our internal s elf -
experiences that have been created and produced by our "multitude of interrelated cognitive 
modules in the brain" (Zahavi, 2014, 3). 
Albahari continues this trend by emphasizing the distinctions between phenomenology 
and metaphysics as well as between experience and reality, in which she notes that our s ense 
of self has been formed by our feelings, thoughts, and sensations of existence in reality  on ly . 
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Utilizing Buddhist concepts, she suggests that our sense of self lacks realistic elements that 
can exist as an entity but merely as a non-real abstract concept. Zahavi repeats her analysis  in  
order to question the real existence of the notion of the self: 
One of the interesting aspects of Albahari's proposal is that whereas many advocates of a 
no-self doctrine have denied that consciousness is characterized by unity, unbrokenness, 
and invariability, and have taken the denial of these features to amount to a denial of t he 
reality of the self, Albahari considers all three to be real features of consciousness, but 
she nevertheless considers the self to be illusory (Zahavi, 2014, 42). 
In other words, these two scholars have drawn a clear line between the self as a product  
of human brain activity and the self as just the manner the subject uses to access the structu re 
of facts. That is, we cannot refer to the independent entity of the self as an experienced even t . 
However, this interpretation holds an intrinsic contradiction within itself. In assuming that the 
self is only a product of mental activity, constituted by interactions within thoughts, feelings , 
and sensations, both Metzinger and Albahari ignored the fact that human feelings, sensations, 
and thoughts cannot exist independently of external interaction with events or objects . There 
is no such thing as pure feeling or thought. It is always the feeling of what, the thought of 
something. We are addressing the subject's ability to evaluate, judge, and deduce during its 
interaction with the environment. In other words, the self is not only the product of that in ter-
action but also a form of the cognitive subject in the projection of things. 
Zahavi disagrees with both the abovementioned scholars. He mentions that their under-
standings seem to imply that the concept of the self is merely the domain of interpretation of 
philosophers. They have ignored the fact that the concept o f the self is a topic of concern  and  
interpretation not only in "cognitive science, development psychology, sociology" but also  in  
"neuropsychology, and psychiatry" (Zahavi 2014, 4). 
To solidify his argument, Dan Zahavi used interpretations of scholars like Gibson and 
Ulric Neisser's research on psychology to prove that the cognitive subject is not an entity that  
passively receives the reflection of reality but rather a dynamic one that actively explores  the 
environment. Moreover, it is the sense of the self that, when actively involved in interact ions  
with the diversity of things and environment, helps the cognitive subject recognize themselves 
in the relationship "between perceiver and environment." All human perceptions are the  " co-
perception of self and environment" (Zahavi, 2014, 4). Neisser's studies indicated that as soon 
as a baby is one month old, it is able to distinguish between objects within the range of reach  
and those that are out of reach. This means the infant possesses the capacity to determine what 
belongs to it and what is outside its scope. By distinguishing five different concepts of the self 
– "ecological self, interpersonal self, conceptual self, temporally extended self, and private 
self" – Neisser concludes that it is an individual experiencing his/herself to determine his or 
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her own space and peripheral space, the self has potential materials of the "basic form of s elf-
experience" (Zahavi, 2014, 4) to shape judgment and motivate behavior. 
We can explore this statement in more detail by returning to Jean Piaget's child psy-
chology experiments. In these experiments, for example, when an object (such as a watch) 
was hidden under two different cushions, the baby, Jacqueline, raised the right cushion to find  
the watch and ignored the other cushion. She only focused on the object that she wanted to 
find. In another experiment, a baby named Laurent was able to manage both visual and inv is -
ible space when he ignored all of the options that were shown by the experimenter (a shoe, a 
toy, a ribbon) to find the right object that he was searching for from the beginning (a little 
box). This means that a baby's eyes will search for the object, pointing fingers toward the 
space where the child's eye cannot reach or see and finding the thing that it wants to have 
(Piaget, 1954, 66-78). These experiments demonstrated that a child from 14 to 20 months old 
has already formed a capacity for judgment on the absentee status. Tran Duc Thao argued this 
by suggesting the existence of a complex consisting of all positions (the whole unseen  s itua-
tion) in which the child is able to manage the space around itself and the objects (Tran Duc 
Thao, 1984, 48-60). These interactive actions have created the contact and connection be-
tween the subject and the object to which it is directed. Moreover, by managing the space 
around itself and the unseen situations, the subject can form its representation o f the ob ject . 
The next step in this interaction is the subject 's ability to extend its own space beyond the arm 
and eye range to assign its control to the object and simultaneously enclose the object into  it s  
own space. 
It should be noted that the formation of the subject 's representation of the object here 
should not be construed as the establishment of a stable and constant referen ce s ys tem with  
which to determine the object. To paraphrase Kai Nielsen, we cannot separate any representa-
tions of specific objects and practices. The human language used to access the object  cannot 
stand outside the relationship that the language refers to (Shook, John R. & Margolis, 2009, 
131). This interpretation negates Metzinger and Albahari's stance of the concept of the self as  
unrealistic. 
In the early stage of the self's formation, as seen in Piaget's experiment, a child applies 
its own representation to the object it seeks. At that point, the object no longer exists as a 
peripheral entity (i.e., outside the subject) but becomes the subject itself. In other words, it 
becomes part of the subject's space of management. The self, at the beginning of it s for-
mation, does not exist as "a pure self" separated from interaction but must be understood as 
the enlargement of itself in the object and the possession of the object into the self's space. 
The beginning of the possibility of the existence of the self originates from the interac-
tion between the subject and object. The self cannot be understood as an independent  th ing  
but is formed by the subject experiencing itself, and by which aware itself like the way Dan 
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Zahavi asserts that the self can only be the experiential-self, the self-consciousness. It s hou ld  
be noted that the experience cannot be interpreted as a process originating from the s ub ject 's  
private purpose and intention. The subject is not able to experience itself but is only able to 
experience something in something else. Even the process of self-consciousness is the res u lt  
of self-liberation as a means through which the subject recognizes themselves as an object 
that they aim to achieve. The self as self-awareness starts with the subject realizing it as the 
subject, that is, it is different from the object. Then the subject approaches the object as part of 
the subject's managed space. The third step is to understand that the subject assigns its repre-
sentativeness to the object and sees itself in the object. Finally, the subject separates itself 
from itself in order to see itself as an object to perceive. Thus, "selves are not born, but arise 
in a process of social experience and interchange" (Zahavi, 2014, 11). Zahavi reaffirms this 
point when he discusses the views of French and German philosophers such as Benveniste, 
Foucault, and Sartre. He utilizes their arguments to confirm that "subjectivity, rather than 
being a given, something innate and fundamental, is a cultural and linguistic constructio n" 
(Zahavi, 2014, 10) and to argue for the intention and purpose of the self as a concept that 
implies a possible object (one is always subject to, or the subject of, something). Arguments 
he used included that of Foucault, who conceived the idea of "the subject who is cons t itu ted 
as subject—who is ‘subjected '—is he who obeys" (Zahavi, 2014, 10) and Sartre's account that 
"an experience does not simply exist, it exists in such a way that it is implicitly self-given, or, 
as Sartre puts it, it is ‘for itself' (…) that is, self-consciousness" (Zahavi, 2014, 11). 
However, this direction by Zahavi has a problem that Kym Maclaren pointed out in  her 
2008 study. That is, when Zahavi and other psychologists attempt to prove the possib ility  o f 
the self in the interaction and exchanging of itself with the object, they default to the existence 
of the "subject" as the starting point of the self-consciousness process. There is the default 
existence of "I" and "mine" as the subject of cognition as well as the object outside of "I"  and  
"mine." Although the process of forming the self comes from the interaction with the object 
through which the subject realizes itself, there is no process of accessing the object without 
the concept of "I" and "mine" as the origin point of the awareness. Zahavi and the phenome-
nologists and existentialists quoted by him all assert the embodied self by acknowledging  the 
intention and purpose of the experience. However, this leads to another question: If we ass ert  
that the experience must be an experience of something, then should we be skeptical about 
"who is the subject of that experience?" Kym Maclaren argues that if the formation of the self 
begins to experience the difference between the subject and the object, then the experience 
must be presumably available when the subject approaches the object as something that does 
not belong to the scope of the subject's eyes and arms. In other words, the subject  mus t  pos -
sess a prior ability to distinguish itself from the other, i.e. a perception of themselves as a self. 
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The ability to see oneself in others as a premise 
for the self-consciousness process 
 
In her study, Maclaren points out that Zahavi, Neisser, Butterworth, and Stern have 
acknowledged that the infant was very early in its ability to see itself as an embodied entity 
that is different from others, the ability of self-perception that "I" is approaching and interact -
ing with the object and that the object is not me or does not belong to me. 
Infants possess, much earlier, an ability to distinguish themselves perceptually, as em-
bodied subjects, from other objects and people (…) she may able to distinguish unreflectively, 
in her perceptual engagement with the world, between ‘my ' and the other's actions, ‘my' em-
bodied being and the other's, and ‘myself' and that thing (Maclaren, 2008, 66). 
Thus, recognizing the "very nature of perception" as  "a lived sense of distinction" 
(Maclaren, 2008, 66) of the subject as a premise for the experience process is imperative in 
order to access the interaction between subject and object. In other words, there is no proces s  
of experiencing if the subject does not recognize the distinction between itself and others.  
Maclaren explains this trend by analyzing the psychological studies of Gibson and 
Butterworth on the movement of subject vision and the "moving room" case study (Maclaren, 
2008, 66). Whether accidentally or deliberately, the vision of the world from the subject 's eyes 
will change depending on whether the moving head of the subject is the starting point for th is  
interpretation. As we turn our heads, the image of the world moves in the direction of the 
rotation of the head, i.e. the image of the world the subject receives is not fixed but instead 
depends on how the subject looks at it. At the same time, the subject's body does not move, 
and if we look down the tip of our nose at any time, it does not move. Put yourself in the 
shoes of a child who is beginning to become capable of managing things in the space it is 
trying to access, which is a primitive understanding of the distinction between the viewer and  
the viewed world. Maclaren contends that Zahavi used this view to point out how a child 
perceives the difference between its body and the world around it. This is the crux of the 
theory of the self-experience as the self-consciousness. It begins with the premise that an 
individual recognizes themselves as a self rather than a thing. The acceptance of the in terac-
tion of the environment in oneself must emanate the clear distinction that I am looking at the 
world, and the world is coming to me: "Primary body-awareness is not a type of object-
consciousness, is not a perception of the body as an object at all…, but on the contrary a 
genuine form if self-experience" (Zahavi 2004, 58, quoted by Maclaren, 2008, 67) 
This view, according to Maclaren's argument, is the continuation of traditional phe-
nomenological perspectives that assert the subjectivity of the experience process and that  the 
self-consciousness cannot be seen as an object. In the study by Butterworth and Neiss er on the 
"moving room," the psychologists also pointed out that when a child is placed in a room with  
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a movable wall, it will move forward if the wall recedes or fall backward if the wall ap-
proaches it. That means that the child, in addition to being able  to manage the surrounding 
space, can also use the information that the world brings to it to promote action as an active 
subject: "the infant as agent ‘make use of' this information to control her actions" (Maclaren 
2008, 68). Thus, the sense of self is formed when the subject, using "an internal motor schema 
or ‘motor plan '" (Stern, 1985, quoted by Maclaren, 2008, 68) perceives themselves as a self 
and recognizes themselves as an active subject who can manage space and promote action 
with their will.  
Zahavi and the above psychologists acknowledge that the consciousness of the self as  
a unique entity is the most important premise in forming the distinction between the subject 
and the object through which the self experiences the interaction between its bod y and the 
environment. That is, the perspective of the "first person" as I and mine is already present in  a 
complex set of possibilities that a baby has since birth, and the interaction with the ob ject , as  
well as the possibility of space management, does not stem from social conditions and the will 
of others. 
Maclaren contends that the perception of an object as a person is entirely differen t  the 
observation of an object as an inanimate object. The innate ability of a child to observe ob-
jects could play a role in shaping a clear perception of the difference between subject and 
object, but this is not enough to form an awareness of the self. The child can catch things and  
manage space around it proactively, but this is not an expression of self-awareness as a self. 
When a child receives feedback from others, such as when a baby is pointing and demanding  
a toy, another person catches and gives it to the baby. Then and only then, when it receives 
this acknowledgment and re-engagement from others, can the infant realize the possible exis -
tence of itself as a living entity. That means, through Maclaren's theory, that "selfhood is 
socially conditioned rather than given with consciousness " (Maclaren 2008, 63). We can 
move backward in time to find a point of view that  supports this analysis. Mark Johnson 
(1993), in his book Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics, poin ted  
out that the self cannot be identified by purely biological mechanisms and physical interac-
tions but by the participation of the subject in the process of interacting with others  in  s ocial 
contexts and historical situations. "The self is defined (…) by its ends, its interpersonal rela-
tionship, its cultural traditions, its institutional commitments, and its historical context. Within 
this evolving context it must work out its identity" (Johnson 1993, 150). The identification of 
the self and the definition of its action privately begins with a complex of subjective percepti-
on and imagination when perceiving an object. It only plays  an initial role in forming the self, 
but it is not the self. We must understand the self as a process of experiencing itself from 
moment to moment, from situation to situation, in a social and moral relationship in which the 
subject recognizes the temporary nature of his or her characteristics. 
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 How do we understand the conflict that Zahavi is facing? Is there another explana-
tion for Maclaren's critique of Zahavi? Is there a possible explanation of the cognitive ability 
of the self that has been formed as soon as a baby is born? 
Zahavi seemed to have realized that he must utilize scientific explanations rather than 
purely philosophical inquiries into the notion of the self. Nowadays, neuroscience is a compe-
tent research area that provides us with a necessary foundation for self-awareness and self-
image. David Precht pointed out in his research that, as early as the 1920s, scientists like 
Emile Devaux and Louis Bolk discovered the mechanism of brain development. The human 
brain continues to grow after birth at the same rate it does in the womb. Eventually, it reaches  
a size that surpasses the brains of other primates, especially in the cerebral cortex areas of 
spatial orientation, musical sensibility, and concentration capability  (Pretch 2011, 10-18). 
Precht also observed that Cajal's research results gave us an insight into the fantastic p roper-
ties of brain cells, which are completely different than other body cells. It is noteworthy that 
the nerve cells can feel, act, hope, and desire (Pretch 2011, 18-26).  
Using new discoveries in neuroscience, Zahavi presented his views on how the s elf is  
formed through interaction with others. How can one survive in a living space – not just the 
subject and the object but also the many others that the subject must interact with? The s ub-
ject is not only required to be capable of understanding, recognizing, and responding to the 
actions of others but also must possess the capacity to explain and predict the behavior of 
others. Gallese points out that we can understand other persons as intentional objects not only  
by tracing origin from linguistic interactions or states of mental activity but also from the 
most essential element of the self: the "mirror neurons." 
Rizzolatti, Gallese, and Forgasi discovered that a group of neurons in the premotor 
cortex of the macaque monkey fired not only when the monkey performed a certain action 
(…) but also when it observed other individuals, be it other monkeys or humans, performing 
the same goal-directed action. (Zahavi 2014, 154) 
The discoveries of Gallese in 1996 and the accidental discoveries when studying the 
activity of the F5 brain region (the premotor cortex) of Rizzolatti in 1992. In 1992, by chance, 
scientist Giacomo Rizzolatti of the University of Parma in Italy found that cells in the F5 area 
in the cortex of the monkey were very specific: these cells activate, go into action (this brain 
cells glow red, indicating that they are active) not only when the monkey performs a deliber-
ate task - such as opening a door - but also act when the monkey see its friend doing the s ame 
movement (in this example is opening a door). That is, there is a "similarity" between the 
brain of the practiced monkey and the observed one. Rizzolatti published the results in 1996 
in the journal Cognition Brain Research. This discovery proved that when the subject ob-
serves an action, the reflection mechanism in this group of neurons is triggered as a form of 
action simulation, i.e., the actions observed by the subject are not only reflected in the observ-
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er's subjective image but also trigger the corresponding brain regions to simulate the observed 
activity. In neurosurgery, by using fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging), both Allan 
Siegel and Hreday Sapru proved in their book Essential Neuroscience that the response in the 
premotor cortex is more complex than in the primary motor cortex. This brain region can even 
provide the control and management the muscles by predicting the information that it re-
ceived from the F4 region (the primary motor cortex): "This region of cortex controls the 
distal musculature by virtue of its projections upon primary neurons of area 4," and lesions  in  
this brain region (SMA – Supplementary Area Cortex, and PMC – Premotor Area Cortex) 
will make a person lose the ability to control of the targeted behavior (Siegel, Allan & Sapru 
2011, 332). 
It is not just a simulation ability of the other's actions, the mirror neurons can also help  
the subject perceives the object as an intentional entity, which is the ability to predict  behav-
ior. The subject can understand another person's behavior because the subject is capable of 
practicing that behavior, and the subject can explain and predict that behavior because the 
subject is capable of explaining themselves when they perform the act. 
The motor schema of the observer has to be involved. That is, the observer must rely 
in his or her own internal motor knowledge (provided by the mirror neurons) in order to trans-
late the observed movement. (Zahavi 2014, 154) 
This means that if the actions cannot be simulated or explained by the observer's inter-
nal motor schema, the purpose and intentionality of action cannot be understood and accepted 
by the subject. This simulation and interpretation mechanism is not limited to the observation  
of visually physical actions but extends to a larger dimension of human relations, including 
the sensation of emotion. 
When the subject observes an action that contains emotion, the effect reaches the s ub-
ject and activates the corresponding brain regions to cause both a simulation and similar emo-
tion in them. Why does this mechanism appear? Emotions conveyed through specific behav-
ior are a complex set of reflections that the subject cannot experience through simple s ens es. 
We cannot see pain or smell insults, but why can we perceive those feelings in others ? Here, 
we are referring to a system of perceptions in the brain that functions corresponding to each of 
the behaviors it receives. This perception comes from the understanding and explaining of the 
behavior of others. When the subject explains and simulates the behavior of others, they  un-
consciously and automatically recognize the similarity between themselves and others. In 
other words, the other person does not exist as an object that is independent of the subject bu t  
as an object assigned to the representative of the subject. 
By combining neurosurgery's findings with the philosophical arguments on cognit ive 
process, we recognize that this simulation ability of behavior is not just a mental response but  
a form of self-consciousness like the explanation of the Theory of Mind (ToM, neural basis) 
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of Rebecca Saxe in 2009: "an observer might understand someone else's action using the 
same cognitive and neural mechanisms that she uses to plan her own. The idea is sometimes 
called the ‘motor theory of social cognition '" (Banks 2009, 408). We have an image of the 
object attached to the image of the subjectivity in the subject, which constitutes the object -
consciousness as the subjective experience of the subject. Humans see themselves first in 
others, as in a mirror. "I" can understand "your" behavior because "I" can simulate it . " You"  
are my image outside of "me", so "you" are representative of "me". Therefore, the effects that  
make up the emotion in "you" can be understood and felt by "me." An account initially ex-
pressed by Marx in which "Peter only establishes his own identity as a man by first compar-
ing himself with Paul as being of like kind. And thereby Paul, just as he stands in his Pauline 
personality, becomes to Peter the type of the genus homo" (Marx, 1887, 55, note 19) was 
further explained by neuroscientist Marco Iacoboni "Mirror neurons suggest that we pretend  
to be in another person's mental shoes (…) In fact, with mirror neurons we do not have to 
pretend, we practically are in another person's mind" (Ker Than, 2005) and Zahavi's account 
on the ability of the subject to establish a bridge between experiencing action and feeling a 
sense of action (Zahavi, 2014, 155). 
When we receive information from others, the intrinsic representation, which we use 
to assign to others, is awakened by functional brain areas expressing emotions corresponding  
to the emotions that we recognize could arise in others: "Observing others experience disgus t  
activates regions involved in the subjective feeling of disgust" (Zahavi, 2014, 155). This 
means that although "I" cannot see the feeling of disgust in "you", "I" have the ability to asso-
ciate the disgusting act, which "you" are suffering, with my feelings about that act because 
that is the feeling that "I" would feel if "I" were treated like "you" are now. Gallese asserted 
that our availability of "an internal motor knowledge (provided by the mirror neurons)" pro-
vides the ability to perceive others as our reflection and that we are also a reflectio n of others ' 
emotions. This mechanism, from the very beginning, allows us to directly experience the 
understanding of other people automatically, without inference and without depending on any 
cognitive method, concept system, or rational thinking process.  
Thus, if we assume that the subject can perceive itself as a self, we should recognize 
the possibilities for forming the self exist in the human brain structure as soon as it is created . 
Interaction with the environment (i.e. inanimate objects and other people) will activate the 
features available in the human brain. The awareness of the self has congenital conditions, 
and it is characterized by social interaction.  
It is obvious the arguments of neuroscience above do not deny the skepticism of 
Maclaren for Dan Zahavi. As long as we assume that an individual already has a default of 
him/herself as a self which different from the things outside, then her question is remain. 
Neuroscientific discoveries that demonstrate the function of the mirror neurons do n ot negate 
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the interaction between the subject and others to form the self, i.e., the interaction between 
human with each other rather than the observing the things only. However, the explanations 
for the function of simulating and predicting the behavior and emotion of the mirror neurons , 
especially the automatic and unconsciousness of this function, have demonstrated the under-
standing of the self's formation which already has biological materials since the baby was 
born. These biological materials, on their own, cannot form the self-awareness of a person  as  
a self if there is no interaction with others. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What we recognize here is that the self is not the self-awareness of the subject itself. 
Psychological, neurological, and philosophical analyses  show that existence of the subject  as  
an entity is only relative, i.e. the identification of the subject and subjectivity is only valid in 
the frame of reference with the object and space around the subject. The self does not origi-
nate from the subject's inner contemplation of itself. The self, with its innate conditions, is 
activated and formed from the beginning by the subject realizing the difference between it and 
the object. The recognition of this difference goes hand in hand with the process of extend ing  
the reach of the subject out of its scope and entering itself into the object. In other words , the 
subject realizes the difference between it and the object and finds itself as an image in the 
other. 
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